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THE CHILDREN'S INTERNET PROTECTION
ACT IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS: THE GOVERNMENT
STEPPING ON PARENTS' TOES?
Kelly Rodden*
INTRODUCTION
Public schools increasingly provide students with Internet access.1
Schools have Internet access for mandatory online activities as part of
the classroom curriculum, as well as for voluntary student use in
school libraries and computer labs.2 The unique nature of the Internet
allows schools to expand astronomically the amount of information
they can provide to students, making Internet accessibility highly
appealing.3 In addition, the government has instituted programs
subsidizing telecommunications services in public schools, thus
increasing Internet presence in public schools by making it more
affordable for schools to offer online access.4
One such government initiative is the Telecommunications Act,
signed in 1996 by President Clinton and further defined by the Federal
Communications Commission in 1997.1 This legislation established
the Universal Service Fund, or E-rate program, designed to provide
* J.D. Candidate, 2004, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to thank
Professor Abner Greene for his comments and guidance; my parents, Matt, Keith,
and my friends for their constant love and encouragement; and special thanks to
Martin Weisgold for helping me get started.
1. See generally Kelley Baker, Public Schools and the Internet, 79 Neb. L. Rev.
929 (2000); Nat'l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Educ., Internet Access in U.S.
Public Schools and Classrooms: 1994-2001 (Sept. 2002), http://nces.ed.gov/
pubs2002/2002018.pdf [hereinafter Internet Access in U.S. Pub. Sch.]; U.S. Census
Bureau, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, U.S. Census Bureau Reports on Computer, Internet
Access, U.S. Dept. of Commerce News Washington, D.C. (Sept. 6, 2001),
http://www.usembassy.it/file200109/alia/al090605.htm [hereinafter U.S. Census
Bureau Report].
2. See Internet Access in U.S. Pub. Sch., supra note 1, at 5.
3. Cf. Baker, supra note 1, at 929 ("Internet users can access an almost limitless
array of information with the click of a mouse.").
4. See, e.g., Patricia F. First & Yolanda Y. Hart, Access to Cyberspace: The New
Issue in Educational Justice, 31 J.L. & Educ. 385, 389-90 (2002) (suggesting that the
growth of Internet access in public schools is a result of federal telecommunications
subsidy programs such as E-rate).
5. Schools and Libraries Corporation, U.S. Dep't of Educ., Universal Service
Program (Dec. 1997), at http://www.ed.gov/Technology/erateforms/slcmaila.html.
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and expand affordable online services in public schools.6 Under this
program, the government grants discounts of twenty to ninety percent
for telecommunications services for public schools, depending on each
school's particular need and location. Discounts apply to charges for
Internet service as well as internal connections necessary to provide
Internet access.' Unfortunately, as government subsidies have
enabled more schools to afford Internet service, and Internet presence
in public schools has increased, several problems with student access
to online materials have become evident.
One of the problems stemming from student Internet use in public
schools is the possibility of student exposure to the substantial amount
of pornographic material available on the Internet.9 In light of this
concern, the government has implemented regulations to protect
children from harmful online material." A recent statute targeting
this goal is the Children's Internet Protection Act ("CIPA"). 1' Signed
by President Clinton in December 2000, CIPA "requires that schools
and public libraries receiving federal support adopt and implement
'technology protection' measures on all modem-equipped computers
as a condition of receiving federal funds. ' 12 In its attempt to regulate
the availability of information in public schools, however, this statute
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. See generally Am. Library Ass'n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 419
(E.D. Pa. 2002) (discussing the amount and accessibility of sexually explicit material
on the Internet); Mark C. Alexander, The First Amendment and Problems of Political
Viability: The Case of Internet Pornography, 25 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 977, 981
(2002) (noting a growing "concern over the easy accessibility to and the sheer volume
of sexually explicit material on the Internet, especially in light of the increasing
number of children online"); Kathleen Conn & Perry A. Zirkel, Legal Aspects of
Internet Accessibility and Use in K-12 Public Schools: What Do School Districts Need
to Know?, 146 W. Ed. L. Rep. 1, 7 (2000) ("The increasing use of the Internet as an
educational tool ... has the potential to bring disturbing, non-educationally
appropriate images into school libraries and classrooms at the click of a computer
mouse."); Rebecca L. Covell, Note, Problems with Government Regulation of the
Internet: Adjusting the Court's Level of First Amendment Scrutiny, 42 Ariz. L. Rev.
777, 777-78 (2000) (describing mechanisms that trap and force users to view
pornography on the Internet, and explaining why this is particularly harmful for
minors); Sally Rutherford, Note, Kids Surfing the Net at School: What Are the Legal
Issues?, 24 Rutgers Computer & Tech. L.J. 417 (1998) (providing a general discussion
about inappropriate material on the Internet and possible consequences of children
viewing this information); infra Part I.A.
10. Two early examples of government attempts to protect children from
exposure to harmful material on the Internet include the Communications Decency
Act, 47 U.S.C. § 223 (a) (2000) (amended); and the Child Online Protection Act, 47
U.S.C. § 231(a) (2000) (currently enjoined following ongoing litigation). See infra Part
I.B.1.
1.1. Children's Internet Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 254 (2000).
12. Kathleen Conn, Protecting Children From Internet Harm (Again): Will the
Children's Internet Protection Act Survive Judicial Scrutiny?, 153 W. Ed. L. Rep. 469,
473 (2001).
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raises important legal questions, including (but not limited to) what
information students should have access to, and who is the
appropriate agent to make this decision. 3
This Note discusses legal issues surrounding CIPA and specifically
assesses whether CIPA's regulation of student Internet access in
schools violates parents' constitutional right to raise and educate their
children. 4 Part I of this Note provides a general background of
student Internet use, including the extent of the Internet's presence in
public schools, problems arising from this presence, and how this issue
has been addressed by Congress. This part includes a detailed
discussion of CIPA, one of Congress's efforts to protect children from
harmful material on the Internet, and explains some legal questions
about this statute. Part II outlines one legal controversy in particular:
whether CIPA intrudes on parental liberty. This part presents both
sides of the argument-parents' potential accusations that CIPA
infringes their constitutional right to raise their children, versus the
state's defense that CIPA does not unconstitutionally interfere with
parents' rights. Finally, Part III argues that CIPA does not violate
parents' constitutional right to rear their children because the state
has a strong interest in protecting children from accessing
inappropriate material at school, the state has the authority to create
laws to achieve this objective, and, furthermore, the statute does not
affect parents' decision-making authority over this issue in private
realms outside of schools.
I. BACKGROUND
The following section presents background information necessary
to understand both CIPA itself, and the events leading up to its
inception. Section A discusses the prominence of Internet access in
public schools, and explains some of the problems resulting from
students using online services. Section B outlines three Congressional
attempts to address these problems, including CIPA.
A. Internet Presence in Schools
In 1997, an estimated 60% of children's Internet access "t[ook]
place outside the home, principally in schools and libraries."' 5 A 2002
survey showed a continuing trend, with only three in ten children
13. Cf Conn & Zirkel, supra note 9, at 1 ("Legal issues arise from the unique
characteristics of the Internet ... [and] [s]uch issues in the school setting include the
constitutionality of limiting access to Internet information in classrooms and school
libraries ... ").
14. See infra notes 108-15 and accompanying text (describing parents'
constitutional right to raise and educate their children).
15. Baker, supra note 1, at 930 (referring to a study presented at the Internet
Online Summit in December 1997).
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using the Internet at home.16 The Department of Education published
a study reporting that as of the fall of 2001, 99% of public schools in
the United States provided students with Internet access. 17 Internet
service in the classroom, specifically, increased from 3% in 1994, to
87% in 2001.18 Internet service now typically is included not only in
classrooms, but also for voluntary student use-for example in school
libraries-both during and sometimes outside of school hours. 9 As
the Internet has become more prominent in schools, online access
increasingly is valued as a helpful resource z.2  Additionally, many
consider Internet instruction an important aspect of educational
development, necessary to familiarize students with technological
resources that they will be expected to use in the outside world.z
Attitudes such as these further encourage schools to acquire Internet
access for their students.
While student access to the Internet has numerous advantages and
offers valuable opportunities, there are disadvantages as well. One of
these is that a substantial amount of the information available on the
Internet is obscene, or at least considered inappropriate for minors to
22view. The government has argued that "the Internet threatens to
render irrelevant all prior efforts to protect children from indecent
material. ' '23  The extensive presence of sexually explicit material on
16. U.S. Census Bureau Report, supra note 1 (reporting statistics from Current
Population Survey data). This survey also noted that only 20% of families with
household incomes below $25,000 had Internet access at home. Id.
17. Internet Access in U.S. Pub. Sch., supra note 1, at 3 (noting an increase from
1994, when only 35% of public schools had online service).
18. Id.
19. Id. at 5 (reporting that in 2001, 51% of public schools with Internet access also
provided this service outside of regular school hours).
20. See supra note 3.
21. See Baker, supra note 1, at 929 ("Familiarity with computer technology and
the Internet is vital to our children's future."); Philip T.K. Daniel & Patrick Pauken,
The Electronic Media and School Violence: Lessons Learned and Issues Presented, 164
W. Ed. L. Rep. 1, 1 (2002) ("[T]he goals and missions of education must be
transformed so that the eager participants-the students-may be prepared to
contribute and succeed in this increasingly technological world.").
22. The Supreme Court defined "obscenity" in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15
(1973), as work that
(a)... "the average person, applying contemporary community standards"
would find that... taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest...
(b) ... depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) ... taken as a whole,
lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Id. at 24 (citations omitted). Additionally, material that does not quite meet this
standard, but is nonetheless sexually explicit, might still be harmful to children.
23. Anthony Niccoli, Legislative Reform, Least Restrictive Means: A Clear Path
for User-Based Regulation of Minors' Access to Indecent Material on the Internet, 27 J.
Legis. 225, 226 (2001) (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, Reno v. ACLU, 521
U.S. 844 (1997) (No. 96-511)). The Court has repeatedly upheld state actions aimed
at protecting minors from harmful material, in the interest of their general welfare
and sense of morality. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 18-19 ("This Court has recognized that
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the Internet is notable and growing. Pornographic websites multiplied
from approximately 28,000 to 60,000 between 1998 and 2000.24 By
2002, the Internet contained an estimated 100,000 pornographic web
sites that were accessible without any charge or registration,2 5 plus
tens of thousands of pages of child pornography.26 The number of
visitors to these sites has increased as well.27
Not only is the amount of sexually explicit material on the Internet
problematic, but the availability and accessibility of this information is
a concern as well. As previously mentioned, many sexually explicit
sites are free of charge and do not require user registration
information.28  Innocuous domain names and ambiguous site
descriptions sometimes make it difficult to avoid viewing
pornographic material.29 Users often unintentionally reach sexually
explicit sites,30 and recurring pop-up windows impede users' ability to
exit these sites once they are accessed.3" Industry mechanisms such as
"kidnappings" -redirecting users from legitimate websites to
pornographic ones-and "mousetrappings" -disabling "back" and
"close" buttons, and linking users to additional sexually explicit
sites-force users to view pornographic information against their
will. 32 Furthermore, the structure of the Internet affords accidental
exposure to inappropriate information more readily than other forms
of media because "sex on the Internet is not segregated and
signposted like in a bookstore."33
the States have a legitimate interest in prohibiting dissemination or exhibition of
obscene material when the mode of dissemination carries with it a significant danger
of... exposure to juveniles." (footnote omitted) (citing -as examples of this
recognition Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 567 (1969); Ginsberg v. New York, 390
U.S. 629, 637-43 (1968); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 690 (1968);
Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767, 769 (1967); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 195
(1964))).
24. Alexander, supra note 9, at 981.
25. In addition, there are many pornographic sites that have some fees or
verification process, plus numerous sites that contain material that is sexually explicit,
but fall short of being characterized as "pornography."
26. See Am. Library Ass'n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 406 (E.D. Pa.
2002).
27. Alexander, supra note 9, at 981 (citing a study indicating that pornography site
visitors increased approximately 30% between December 1999 and February 2001).
28. Am. Library Ass'n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 419. The court noted that
approximately 100,000 Internet pornography sites could be accessed without any
expense or verification process. Id, at 406; see also ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473,
476 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (noting that pornographic web sites often show explicit images for
free, as a "teaser" to persuade users to subscribe to the sites).
29. See Alexander, supra note 9, at 983.
30. See, e.g., ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 476 (reporting that innocently
entering the word "dollhouse" or "toys" into a search engine may produce links to
pornographic sites).
31. See Am. Library Ass'n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 419.
32. Covell, supra note 9, at 777-78.
33. Alexander, supra note 9, at 982 (quoting David Finkelhor et al., Crimes
Against Children Research Center, Online Victimization: A Report on the Nation's
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Allowing students to view sexually explicit information at school
offends common societal notions, and contradicts the responsibilities
and functions of public schools. Public schools must provide students
with a vast array of information and different viewpoints, while
simultaneously making discretionary choices about the inclusion and
exclusion of material to which students have access.34 Specifically,
public schools act "in loco parentis, to protect children.., from
exposure to sexually explicit, indecent, or lewd speech."35
Furthermore, public schools must consider potential criminal and civil
liability stemming from student exposure to harmful material.
Schools that fail to implement measures to prevent student exposure
to inappropriate information may face parental actions for negligence
or injunctions prohibiting student Internet use.36
B. Congress's Response to the Problem of Children Accessing Sexually
Explicit Material on the Internet in School
In response to the problem of student access to sexually explicit
information on the Internet and liability concerns arising from this
issue, many public schools voluntarily have implemented regulatory
mechanisms.37 Congress, however, also has responded to these
Youth 34 (2001), http://www.unh.edu/ccrc/Youth-Internet-info-page.html).
34. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986) ("The
undoubted freedom to advocate unpopular and controversial views in schools and
classrooms must be balanced against the society's countervailing interest in teaching
students the boundaries of socially appropriate behavior."); see also Bd. of Educ. v.
Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 863-64 (1982) (recognizing the need to give schools discretion to
make determinations about the information to which children are exposed); Glenn
Kubota, Comment, Public School Usage of Internet Filtering Software: Book Banning
Reincarnated?, 17 Loy. L.A. Ent. L.J. 687, 704-06 (1997) (discussing the indoctrinative
nature of schools).
35. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 684.
36. See Conn & Zirkel, supra note 9, at 10; Rutherford, supra note 9, at 429.
37. Many schools have created acceptable use policies ("AUPs") prohibiting
particular Internet uses, such as viewing sporting events or pornography. See Mark S.
Nadel, The First Amendment's Limitations on the Use of Internet Filtering in Public
and School Libraries: What Content Can Librarians Exclude?, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 1117,
1130 (2000). AUPs are contracts outlining acceptable Internet usage that typically
require parent and student signatures before students are authorized to use Internet
terminals in school. See Internet Access in U.S. Pub. Sch., supra note 1, at 10;
Comm'n on Child Online Prot., Cong. Internet Caucus Advisory Comm., 106th
Cong., Report to Cong. 41 (2000), http://www.copacommission.org/report/
COPAreport.pdf [hereinafter COPA Comm'n Report] ("Acceptable use policies
refer to stated parameters for use of online systems."). The Commission on Child
Online Protection-appointed by Congress to review various methods of preventing
minors from accessing harmful material while using online systems-recommended
that all public institutions offering Internet access implement AUPs that establish
guidelines for appropriate Internet use and inform parents about the measures taken
to protect their children from inappropriate online material. Id. Such policies have
been widely adopted by public schools. In 2001, among schools that had some
procedure in place for preventing student exposure to harmful material on the
Internet (96% of all public schools), 80% made parents sign a written contract before
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concerns. One scholar summarized Congressional efforts, stating,
"Congress has addressed the problem of child access to Internet
pornography in two ways-by regulating transmission of pornographic
material over the Internet and by regulating receipt of that
information. '3  Two early statutes targeted the first goal, regulating
the transmission of pornographic material: the Communications
Decency Act ("CDA"), and the Child Online Protection Act
("COPA"). 39  A more recent statute, CIPA, addresses the second
goal, regulating the receipt of Internet information,"
1. Earlier Statutes-CDA and COPA
The CDA was passed in 1996, making it a crime knowingly to
transmit obscene or indecent communications to minors (under 18
years old),4' and knowingly to use an interactive computer system to
communicate with minors in a manner "patently offensive as
measured by contemporary community standards."42 The act imposed
fines and up to two years imprisonment for violations,43 and provided
four affirmative defenses.4 In Reno v. ACLU, however, the United
States Supreme Court declared the CDA unconstitutional because it
violated the First Amendment.45 The Court examined the CDA
under strict scrutiny because the statute regulated speech content,46
and found that the law abridged First Amendment rights for two
primary reasons. First, the statute failed to define the terms
"indecent" and "patently offensive. '47  The Court concluded this
ambiguity would "chill" speech because speakers might withhold
their children could go online at school, and 75% also required students' signatures.
Internet Access in U.S. Pub. Sch., supra note 1, at 10. In addition to AUPs, other
protection methods voluntarily instituted by schools include monitoring by teachers
or staff, software designed to block or filter inappropriate material, monitoring
software, and honor codes. Id.
38. Covell, supra note 9, at 781.
39. Id. at 781 n.28.
40. Id. at 794.
41. Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 223(a) (2000) (amended).
42. Id. § 223(d).
43. Id. § 223(a), (d).
44. Id. § 223(e) (exempting service providers who were not involved with
transmitting the communications and were not the owners or controllers of the
facility, employers who were not aware of (and did not recklessly disregard) employee
activity in violation of the act, and those individuals who made good faith efforts to
restrict minors' access to communications prohibited by the act, or restricted access by
requiring account/credit authorization or access codes).
45. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870-71 (1997).
46. Id. at 871, 874 (explaining that because the CDA regulated the content of
speech, it raised special First Amendment concerns). To withstand judicial scrutiny,
statutes regulating speech content must be the least restrictive alternative, addressing
a compelling government interest. Id.
47. Id. at 870-71.
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communications rather than risk violating the statute.48 Second, the
Court was concerned about the broad scope of the statute49 and the
overbreadth of its language." The court feared that adult access to
constitutionally protected speech would also be restricted,51 and that
the "community standards" criterion for judging communications
would force all speakers to conform to the standards of the most
conservative community. 2 Therefore, the Court concluded that the
statute was neither narrowly tailored nor the least restrictive
alternative available, and thus violated First Amendment rights.53
COPA was Congress's second attempt to regulate the transmission
of pornographic information over the Internet. Passed in 1998, this
statute criminalized. providing to any minor commercial
communication deemed "harmful to minors, '54 and mandated that
website designers implement barriers requiring proof of age for access
to sites publishing such information. Penalties included fines and up
to six months imprisonment. In an effort to avoid the problems
inherent in the CDA, COPA's drafters attempted to tailor the
statute's language to comply with the requirements articulated by the
Supreme Court in Reno v. A CLU." COPA targeted speech deemed
"harmful to minors" according to a three-prong test," and only
48. Id. at 871-72.
49. The CDA applied to all individuals posting information on the Internet, not
just commercial speakers (which would have been a narrower, more acceptable range
of speech to regulate). Id. at 877.
50. Id. at 874-78.
51. Id. at 874.
52. Id. at 877-79.
53. Id.
54. Child Online Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 231(a) (2000) (currently enjoined
due to ongoing litigation).
55. Id. § 231(c).
56. Id. § 231(a).
57. 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (invalidating the CDA because of several First
Amendment problems stemming from the statute's language); see supra notes 45-53
and accompanying text.
58. Child Online Protection Act § 231(e)(6).
The term "material that is harmful to minors" means any communication,
picture, image, graphic image file, article, recording, writing, or other matter
of any kind that is obscene or that-
(A) the average person, applying contemporary community standards,
would find, taking the material as a whole and with respect to minors, is
designed to appeal to, or is designed to pander to, the prurient interest;
(B) depicts, describes, or represents, in a manner patently offensive with
respect to minors, an actual or simulated sexual act or sexual contact, an
actual or simulated normal or perverted sexual act, or a lewd exhibition of
the genitals or post-pubescent female breast; and
(C) taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value for minors.
Id.; see Covell, supra note 9, at 786-87. This three-prong test is a constitutionally
acceptable definition of obscenity. Id. at 787 (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S.
629 (1968)); see also Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). By contrast, the
CDA did not properly define the speech it regulated, and therefore, was
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applied to commercial providers who published material on the World
Wide Web. 9 Furthermore, Congress maintained parents' ability to
provide their children with materials targeted by the statute, if they
chose to do so.6" However, the ACLU once again objected to
Congress's attempt to regulate the Internet, and consequently filed a
lawsuit challenging COPA.61
In ACLU v. Reno, COPA was criticized for placing an undue
burden on protected adult speech because of the expense of
implementing age verification mechanisms.62 The Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit found the statute unconstitutional because,
although the government had a sufficiently compelling interest in
limiting the transmission of sexually explicit material, the statute was,
once again, not the least restrictive means to do so. 63 The court also
concluded that COPA's community standard definition of "harmful to
minors" (in the first prong of the test)' was unconstitutionally
overbroad because the geographical structure of the Internet would
force speakers to comply with the standards of the most conservative
community.6 The Supreme Court later ruled on COPA, with a
narrow majority finding that the statute's use of a community
standard provision did not "by itself render the statute"
unconstitutional.66 The Court, however, concluded that COPA may
"suffer[] from substantial overbreadth for other reasons," and
therefore maintained the injunction against the statute, remanding for
further consideration.
unconstitutionally vague. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text (explaining
the insufficiencies of the CDA's language, therefore suggesting that by including in
COPA a three-prong test defining "harmful to minors," Congress was attempting to
overcome some of the CDA's problems).
59. Child Online Protection Act § 231(a). The CDA had a much broader scope-
applying to all speakers, in all realms of the Internet-which was one of the reasons
the Court invalidated the statute. See supra note 49.
60. Under COPA, commercial speakers were not entirely precluded from
transmitting sexually explicit material. The material would still be available to adults
who provided age verification. See Child Online Protection Act § 231(a), (c). This
flexibility was not available under the CDA, which was problematic. In reviewing the
statute, the Court was concerned that application of the CDA potentially would have
resulted in an outright prohibition of transmitting sexually explicit information. See
supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
61. ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2000).
62. Id. at 171-72.
63. Id. (basing this conclusion on the fact that credit card authorization methods
are ineffective, the law did not apply to foreign websites, the statute's language was
overinclusive, and other alternatives such as parental regulation were available).
64. See supra note 58.
65. ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d at 175.
66. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 122 S. Ct. 1700, 1713 (2002).
67. Id. at 1713-14.
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2. CIPA
Having faced two defeats, Congress redirected its attention to
regulating children's access to sexually explicit information, rather
than attempting to regulate the transmission of such material. CIPA
is the manifestation of these efforts,"6 and the focus of this Note.
CIPA mandates that public schools and public libraries69 that accept
federal funding for Internet access" must adopt protection measures
as a condition of receiving these funds. 71 Specifically, the "technology
protection measure" must "protect[] against access.., to visual
depictions that are-(I) obscene; (II) child pornography; or (III)
68. Covell, supra note 9, at 794 ("CIPA does not attempt to limit what people say;
rather, it limits reception of certain materials in limited situations.").
69. Although the statute applies to both schools and libraries, this Note only
discusses CIPA in the context of public schools. This segregated analysis is possible
because the statute provides that if any part of the requirements for either schools or
libraries is deemed invalid, the other sections should remain unaffected. Act of Dec.
21, 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763A-350. There are several reasons for
limiting the focus of this Note. First, the implications of CIPA in public schools is a
largely unexplored topic, particularly with regard to parents' rights. CIPA's
application in public libraries, however, has been addressed by scholars, see, e.g.,
Adam Goldstein, Note, Like a Sieve: The Child Internet Protection Act and Ineffective
Filters in Libraries, 12 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 1187 (2002), and by a
federal court. See Am. Library Ass'n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401 (E.D. Pa.
2002) (invalidating CIPA as applied to public libraries as a violation of the First
Amendment). The Supreme Court will also review this issue. See Am. Library Ass'n
v. United States, No. 02-361, 2002 WL 31060372 (U.S. Nov. 12, 2002) (noting probable
jurisdiction). Second, because of the depth and intricacies of the notion of parental
liberty, the legal analysis of CIPA in the school context is extremely intriguing. The
issue raises broad, important concerns extending beyond the circumstances of the
statute itself. These include parental rights in public schools generally, and the
constitutionally permissible scope of state regulation over students.
70. These funds are available under the E-rate or Universal Service Fund
program, and may be used to pay for both Internet service itself, as well as internal
connections necessary to network access. See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text.
71. Children's Internet Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 254(h) (2000). It should be
noted that CIPA is not an absolute regulation, but a form of conditional funding.
This distinction raises questions about the constitutionality of the federal government
conditioning money it gives to the states. While these questions are important, such
analysis is beyond the scope of this Note. However, it is important to point out that,
aside from overcoming other criticisms articulated in this Note, CIPA must also
satisfy the four prong test to determine the constitutionality of conditional funding, as
established in South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (examining a federal law
conditioning highway funds on states setting the legal drinking age at twenty-one).
By conditioning money it gives to the states, the federal government does not exceed
its spending power as long as: 1) the law is for the general good; 2) the condition is
unambiguous; 3) the law relates to a larger federal interest; and 4) the condition is not
barred by other constitutional provisions. Id. at 207-08. This last requirement
prohibits conditions that would require states to "engage in activities that would
themselves be unconstitutional." Id. at 210. If filtering students' Internet use is
constitutional, CIPA presumably complies with all four standards, and therefore
would likely survive a conditional spending challenge. Whether the condition is
constitutional, however, remains unresolved.
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harmful to minors. 72  The statute also requires that schools
implement Internet safety policies,73 and the law prohibits the federal
government from interfering with the determinations about
specifically what information must be filtered.74
Like its predecessors, CIPA has met several criticisms. In response
to CIPA's enactment, one skeptic wrote, "While Congress seemed to
be taking a step in the right direction by changing its focus from
federal regulation to empowering local communities, the reality is that
Congress has failed the people by passing another politically
appealing, yet unconstitutional law."7" Immediately after CIPA's
passage, the American Library Association ("ALA"), in conjunction
with a group of libraries, library patrons, and web site publishers, filed
a suit in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania challenging CIPA in the
context of public libraries.76 The court ruled in favor of the ALA,
invalidating CIPA's application to public libraries as a violation of the
First Amendment.77 The government appealed directly to the
Supreme Court, which recently decided to review the case.7"
Although no suit has been filed challenging CIPA in the context of
public schools, growing concerns may give rise to legal action in this
context as well. Specifically, these concerns include a possible
violation of students' First Amendment right to receive information,
Equal Protection issues, and a perceived encroachment on parents'
constitutional right to make decisions about their children's education.
72. Children's Internet Protection Act § 254(h)(5)(B)(i), (6)(B)(i). The statute
defines "harmful to minors" as
any picture, image, graphic image file, or other visual depiction that-
(i) taken as a whole and with respect to minors, appeals to a prurient interest
in nudity, sex, or excretion;
(ii) depicts, describes, or represents, in a patently offensive way with respect
to what is suitable for minors, an actual or simulated sexual act or sexual
contact, actual or simulated normal or perverted sexual acts, or a lewd
exhibition of the genitals; and
(iii) taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value as to minors.
Id. § 254(h)(7)(G).
73. Id. § 254(h)(5). Such policies must address issues associated with access to
inappropriate material, the safety and privacy of students' electronic communications,
unauthorized access, and unauthorized disclosure of students' personal information.
Id. The school must also provide reasonable public notice of the proposed policy. Id.
74. Id. § 254(/)(2).
75. Alexander, supra note 9, at 1016.
76. Am. Library Ass'n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
77. Id. at 490 ("In view of the severe limitations of filtering technology and the
existence of ... less restrictive alternatives, we conclude that it is not possible for a
public library to comply with CIPA without blocking a very substantial amount of
constitutionally protected speech, in violation of the First Amendment.").
78. Am. Library Ass'n v. United States, No. 02-361, 2002 WL 31060372 (U.S.
Nov. 12, 2002) (noting probable jurisdiction). The case was not heard by a federal
court of appeals because the act provides the right of direct appeal to the Supreme
Court. Act of Dec. 21, 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763A-352.
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a. Students' Right To Receive Information
Although minors do not enjoy exactly the same constitutional rights
as adults,79 children do have some First Amendment rights, and retain
several of these even while at school."' One of these rights includes
the right to receive information.81 Schools have the authority to
restrict student access to certain types of information "in furtherance
of the school's educational goals,"82 but such actions must be balanced
against students' constitutional right to receive information.83 CIPA
must comply with this standard. Additionally, because CIPA is a
content-based restriction on speech, in order to survive a
constitutional challenge on the basis that CIPA violates students' right
to receive information, the statute must be the least restrictive means
possible, serving a compelling government interest.84
Although the state has a compelling interest in protecting minors
from exposure to sexually explicit material, 5 critics argue that CIPA
infringes on students' First Amendment right to receive information
because filtering technology is unreliable and inefficient,86 and
79. See, e.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986) (noting
that particular language deemed acceptable for adult audiences is not necessarily
appropriate for children at school).
80. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)
("It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.").
81. See Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (recognizing students' right to
receive information in the context of book banning). Note, however, that the
existence of a right to receive information has been questioned, particularly because
Pico's holding was issued from a plurality. Id. (Justice Brennan wrote the opinion,
joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens; Justice Blackmun concurred in part and
concurred in the judgment; Justice White concurred in the judgment; and Justices
Burger, Rehnquist, Powell, and O'Connor dissented). Furthermore, one of the
concurring Justices himself argued that there is no such recognizable right. Id. at 878
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
82. Kubota, supra note 34, at 707.
83. See Pico, 457 U.S. at 866-67. Discretion regarding what information is
provided in schools "may not be exercised in a narrowly partisan or political manner."
Id. at 870.
84. See Am. Library Ass'n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401 (E.D. Pa. 2002);
Conn, supra note 12, at 481 ("Since CIPA regulates Internet access to specific kinds
of information, based on the direct, purportedly harmful effect of that expression on
children, courts will likely find that CIPA's regulations are content-based and apply
strict scrutiny review to its provisions.").
85. See supra notes 22-36 and accompanying text (discussing the extent of
inappropriate information on the Internet and reasons why the state has an interest in
shielding students from this).
86. See COPA Comm'n Report, supra note 37, at 19-22. The Commission
researched the effectiveness of various filtering mechanisms, weighing such factors as
availability, cost, First Amendment values, privacy, and law enforcement. It found
server-side blocking-where online service providers voluntarily use software that
identifies URLs with inappropriate content and blocks them-to be the most effective
blocking technology, but only earning a grade of 7.4 out of 10. Id. at 19. The
Commission noted significant First Amendment concerns that server-side filtering is
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therefore is not the least restrictive means available. 7  Filtering
systems deny access to constitutionally protected web sites, while
simultaneously permitting access to web sites that contain harmful
material and should be blocked. 8 The Court's decision in Board of
Education v. Pico9 may defend CIPA against this criticism. This case
established the doctrine that schools may remove books from their
library, as long as removal decisions are based "solely upon the
'educational suitability' of the [materials] in question."9" CIPA seems
to comply with this standard.9' However, it is questionable whether
Pico is persuasive authority for this situation. The case dealt solely
with removal decisions,92 and exclusively with the removal of materials
in school libraries, to be viewed by students voluntarily (as opposed to
materials used as a part of schools' mandatory classroom
curriculum).93  By contrast, CIPA's mandate might be more
appropriately characterized as "selective acquisition" rather than
removal of materials, and (unlike the removal decisions at issue in
Pico) the statute applies to both school library terminals as well as
Internet use as a part of mandatory classroom work.94 Furthermore,
Pico's holding issued from a plurality, and thus its persuasiveness as
authoritative precedent is questionable.9
overinclusive and blocks too much information, which is particularly troublesome
when it is used in libraries and schools. Id. at 20. Client-side filtering-where end-
users voluntarily implement software that prevents downloading content from
specified sources-was deemed even less effective, with a grade of 6.5, and also raised
apprehensions about overinclusiveness. Id. at 21. Finally, server and client combined
filtering using text-based analysis was considered the least effective, with a grade of
5.4, and elicited similar First Amendment concerns. Id. at 22; see also Alexander,
supra note 9, at 1017-20; Adam Horowitz, The Constitutionality of the Children's
Internet Protection Act, 13 St. Thomas L. Rev. 425, 427 (2000).
87. See Conn, supra note 12, at 478-79, 481 (noting that although the government
has more leeway when regulating speech with respect to minors, such regulation still
"must be narrowly tailored").
88. See Goldstein, supra note 69, at 1192; see also supra note 86 (discussing the
COPA Commission's report detailing some of the inefficiencies of filtering
mechanisms).
89. 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
90. Id. at 871. This presumably would result in the unintentional removal of some
constitutionally protected materials, while some harmful materials would remain on
the shelves, similar to what might result from application of CIPA's regulations.
91. CIPA requires schools to filter information that is pornographic, obscene, or
harmful to minors-a standard implicitly based on what is appropriate for minors to
access in an educational setting.
92. See Pico, 457 U.S. at 862, 871 (noting that "nothing in our decision today
affects in any way the discretion of a local school board to choose books to add to the
libraries of their schools").
93. See id. at 861-62; Kubota, supra note 34, at 711.
94. Kubota, supra note 34, at 711 (citing Pico, 457 U.S. at 862, 869).
95. This consideration is especially true given the questions surrounding the
notion of a constitutional right to receive information. See supra note 81.
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b. Fourteenth Amendment/Equal Protection Issues
CIPA may also be criticized as having a disparate impact on low-
income families, thus violating the Fourteenth Amendment's
guarantee of Equal Protection.96 Indigents typically cannot afford
Internet access at home, so they rely on schools and libraries to
provide this service.97 In addition, public schools in low-income
districts presumably depend more on federal funding of online
services than do wealthier districts.98 Therefore, poorer school
districts and the families residing within them may argue that they are
more directly affected by CIPA than wealthier districts that can either
afford Internet access in schools without relying on federal funding
(and thus are not required to implement filtering technology), or have
the means to provide unfettered Internet access at home.
Recognizing that an Equal Protection challenge against CIPA
would likely receive less scrutinizing judicial review," proponents of
this viewpoint may argue that CIPA fails even the lowest level of
judicial scrutiny, thus rendering it incapable of surviving a
constitutional challenge. "" Because the ineffectiveness of filtering
technology allows some inappropriate web sites to slip through blocks,
while simultaneously banning some constitutionally protected
material,"" CIPA may be criticized as not being a rational means to
96. See Goldstein, supra note 69, at 1195-96 (making this argument in the context
of public libraries); cf Geraldine P. Rosales, Comment, Mainstream Loudoun and the
Future of Internet Filtering For America's Public Libraries, 26 Rutgers Computer &
Tech. L.J. 357, 383 (2000) (noting that an important question surrounding Internet
filtering is "whether it is a violation of equal protection to let affluent children, who
likely have computers at home and in school, search the entire Internet while less
fortunate children can only access the (poorly) filtered version in libraries").
97. See U.S. Census Bureau Report, supra note 1 (reporting that among families
with incomes below $25,000, less than 30% had a computer at home, and only about
20% had Internet access at home).
98. With a higher tax base, wealthier school districts may be able to afford
Internet access without relying on federal funding at all.
99. The courts do not consider wealth a suspect classification and therefore, unless
a fundamental right is at issue or the discriminated class is deprived of access to
justice, wealth discrimination claims are reviewed under traditional, not strict
scrutiny. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40 (1973)
(applying traditional, rather than strict, judicial scrutiny in a case where the class
suffering discrimination was based on wealth-and therefore was not suspect-and
the right at issue was the right to education-which is not a fundamental right for
purposes of Equal Protection, and does not constitute a denial of access to justice).
Similarly, an Equal Protection challenge against CIPA would rely on a type of wealth
discrimination that neither violates a fundamental right, nor restricts indigents' access
to justice, and therefore would receive traditional low tier judicial review.
100. Low tier scrutiny (the traditional standard of review) is the lowest level of
judicial analysis, requiring only that a law be rational, serving a legitimate state
purpose, to survive a constitutional challenge of deprivation based on a wealth
classification. See, e.g., id.
101. See Goldstein, supra note 69, at 1192.
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achieve the state's purpose.10 2 If CIPA fails to meet this threshold
standard, then the law violates the Equal Protection Clause.
Whether CIPA violates Equal Protection guarantees remains an
"open question."1"3 In defense of CIPA, the state would likely argue
that filters are not so ineffective that the statute is irrational. On the
other hand, the government itself has recognized the inefficiencies of
filtering mechanisms, 4 thus suggesting that perhaps CIPA violates
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Low tier
judicial scrutiny, however, is a very minimal benchmark, and laws
rarely fail to meet this requirement.1"5 Therefore, CIPA likely would
overcome an Equal Protection challenge.
c. Parental Rights
This Note focuses on the criticism that, by imposing federally
mandated filters, CIPA violates parents' constitutional right to rear
their children.0 6 In response to this challenge, proponents of CIPA
argue that the statute does not violate parents' rights because the state
has a substantial interest in filtering students' Internet use, it enjoys
constitutional authority to do so, and, furthermore, the law does not
restrict parents' freedom to instruct their children outside of the
school setting." 7 Thus, there is an emerging tension between the right
of parents to raise their children according to their own ideals, and the
government's power to control what information is made accessible to
students in public schools.
II. THE CONTROVERSY BETWEEN CIPA AND PARENTS' RIGHTS
Part II examines both sides of this controversy-pro-parents versus
pro-state-by explaining parental liberty as opposed to the competing
interests of the state in the context of mandated filtering of Internet
102. See id. at 1196 ("While in theory there is a rational basis for installing flawed
but occasionally effective filtering software and protecting children, in practice, if
enough of the Web sites that should be blocked manage to get through, the
requirement ceases to be rational.").
103. Id. at 1195-98. Although CIPA has been challenged on other bases, see Am.
Library Ass'n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (reviewing
whether CIPA violates the First Amendment), the courts have yet to hear Equal
Protection claims against the statute.
104. See supra note 86 (discussing the results of the filtering technology report
provided by the COPA Commission, a congressionally-sponsored committee).
105. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law Principles and Policies 529-30
(1997) ("Rational basis review is the minimum level of scrutiny that all laws
challenged under equal protection must meet.... [R]arely have laws been declared
unconstitutional for failing to meet this level of review.").
106. See infra Part II.A. This right is referred to interchangeably throughout this
Note as "parental liberty," "parents' right to educate their children," "parents' right
to educate and raise their children," "parents' right to rear their children," etc.
107. See infra Part II.B.
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access in public schools. Section A outlines parents' potential
arguments that CIPA interferes with their constitutional right to raise
their children. Section B examines the state's potential defense of
CIPA against this challenge.
A. Pro-parent
The Supreme Court has recognized, under the Fourteenth
Amendment, parents' constitutional right to rear and educate their
children." This right is well established, and has been referred to as
"an enduring American tradition.""'9  As Justice McReynolds
famously noted in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, "The child is not the
mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his
destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and
prepare him for additional obligations."'" Accordingly, when the
state attempts to regulate aspects of children's lives, questions arise as
to whether parental liberty is infringed as a result."'
Cases upholding parental rights over state action are built on the
conclusion that the state action was so pervasive that it encroached on
parental liberty entirely, in both public and private realms."2
108. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) ("Without doubt, [the
Fourteenth Amendment] denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also
the right of the individual to ... establish a home and bring up children .... "). The
Court in this decision further defined this right, explaining that it coincides with "the
natural duty of the parent to give his children education suitable to their station in
life," and warning that any government interference with this liberty may not be
"arbitrary or without reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of
the State to effect." Id. at 400. In deciding this case-where plaintiffs challenged an
ordinance prohibiting the teaching of German-the Court found that the prohibition
"materially interfered" with parental control over children's education, and was
therefore unconstitutional. Id. at 401; see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213-
14 (1972) (upholding parents' right to decision-making authority over their children's
religious beliefs); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (invalidating
legislation requiring students to attend public, rather than parochial, schools because
it violated parents' fundamental liberty to control their children's education).
109. Doe v. Irwin, 615 F.2d 1162, 1.167 (6th Cir. 1980) (reviewing a parental rights
violation challenge against a public family planning center that was distributing
contraceptives to minors).
110. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535.
111. See, e.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214 ("[A] State's interest in universal education,
however highly we rank it, is not totally free from a balancing process when it
impinges on fundamental rights and interests, such as ... the traditional interest of
parents with respect to the religious upbringing of their children .. ").
112. See id. at 218, 232 (finding a compulsory-attendance law unconstitutional
because it created a "severe" and "inescapable" burden, forcing students to act
contrary to their religious beliefs, and would result in the state practically determining
the children's religious futures, in opposition to their parents' right to make such
decisions); Pierce, 268 U.S. at 532-35 (voiding a law requiring that students attend
public schools because it abridged parents' right to send their children to either
private or parochial schools); Meyer, 262 U.S. at 397, 401 (overruling a state
prohibition on teaching foreign languages in all types of schools-private,
denominational, parochial, or public). A rare exception to this premise is a New York
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Similarly, cases validating state action-rejecting parents' arguments
that their liberty was violated-do so on the basis that the action in
question does not prohibit parents from teaching their children as
they choose in the privacy of the home, church, etc. As long as state
action does not infringe on private domains of parental decision-
making, courts find that parental rights are not unconstitutionally
constrained.1 3  Therefore, viable arguments in favor of parental
rights, against CIPA, must consider this premise and must be tailored
accordingly. This might be accomplished in two ways. First,
opponents to CIPA could reject legal precedent and argue that even
though the state action does not directly extend beyond the school
environment, parental liberty is still unconstitutionally infringed." 4
Second, CIPA's challengers could concede that parents' rights are
only violated when state action amounts to a total restriction on
parental decision-making authority, but could argue that, because the
statute also applies to public libraries and not all parents can afford
Internet access in the home, for such parents the regulation is
tantamount to an absolute restriction on parental control." 5
1. Parental Rights Violated by State Action in School
The first argument-that parental rights are violated even if state
action does not extend beyond the school-is supported by Alfonso v.
Fernandez."6 In this case, parents of New York City students filed a
complaint against the state for implementing a condom availability
state court case, Alfonso v. Fernandez, 606 N.Y.S.2d 259 (App. Div. 1993). See infra
notes 122-28.
113. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968) (concluding that a
regulation banning the sale of obscene magazines to minors did not overstep the
rights of parents who wanted their children to view this material because parents
could purchase the magazines for their children); Doe, 615 F.2d at 1168 (examining a
publicly operated family planning center that was distributing contraceptives and
medicine to minors, and finding no violation of parents' rights because "[parents]
remain[ed] free to exercise their traditional care, custody and control over their
unemancipated children"); Curtis v. Sch. Comm., 652 N.E.2d 580, 586 (Mass. 1995)
(arguing that unless "governmental action is mandatory and provides no outlet for the
parents," there is no burden on parental liberties). In Curtis, an in-school condom
availability program was upheld because participation in the program was voluntary,
parents had a right to instruct their children not to participate, and no disciplinary
actions or penalties ensued from not participating. Id. at 586-87; cf Mozert v.
Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987) (finding that free
exercise of religion was not violated by a required reading text that offended some
students' religious beliefs). The court in Mozert noted that because Tennessee law
permitted parents to either home school their children or send them to church or
private schools, parents had options that allowed them to avoid exposing their
children to the offensive reading material, and therefore the school's use of this text
was not unconstitutional. Id. at 1067.
114. See infra Part II.A.1.
115. See infra Part II.A.2.
116. 606 N.Y.S.2d 259 (App. Div. 1993).
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program in the city's public high schools."7 The complaint alleged,
among other things, that this initiative "violate[d] their due process
rights to direct the upbringing of their children.""' 8 In defense of the
program, the respondents" 9 argued that because student participation
was voluntary and without penalty for nonparticipation, parents
retained the freedom to instruct their children about sexual matters
according to their own viewpoints, and thus their parental rights were
not violated. 2" The court rejected this argument. 12
The Alfonso court's inquiry focused not on whether parents were
free to instruct their children outside of school, but on whether
important parental decisions were limited at all. 122 The court found an
intrusion on parental liberty because parents are compelled to educate
their children, and because the parents in this case could not afford to
send their children to private school, they were forced to send them to
public school. Therefore, these parents had no choice but to subject
their children to an environment where a condom availability program
was in place. 23  The court concluded that this unconstitutionally
limited parents' control over their children's knowledge about sexual
matters. 24 Furthermore, the parents' complaint consisted of more
than a mere concern that students were being exposed to ideas with
which some of the parents disagreed. 25 Parents were upset that the
schools were providing the means for engagement in activities that
some parents deemed inappropriate. 26 The court thus noted that the
issue was "not one of purpose but one of effect."'1 27 Even though the
117. Id. at 261.
118. Id.
119. The case was first heard in the New York Supreme Court, and was dismissed.
Alfonso v. Fernandez, 584 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1992). The decision discussed
above is the parents' appeal to the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division,
Second Department.
120. Alfonso, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 265-66.
121. Id. at 266 ("[T]hese factors do not constitute proof that the petitioners are not
being forced to surrender a parenting right .... ").
122. Id. The court did not address the issue of whether all realms of decision-
making were affected. Rather, the court considered the fact that the parents were
forced to send their children to school, where their children were exposed to material
with which the parents disagreed. Id. (noting that "the policy ... interfer[ed] with
parental decision making in a particularly sensitive area").
123. Id. The court did not comment about the possibility of home schooling, an
option that would weaken the court's argument that parents were forced to expose
their children to the program. It may be surmised, however, that if the parents could
not afford to send their children to private school, they also would not have the luxury
of staying at home to educate their children. Therefore, even with the option of home
schooling, the court could make the same argument that parents were thus compelled
to send their children to public school and, consequently, they were required to
submit to the condom distribution program.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
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schools acted in the interest of protecting the students' health, the
schools' means of accomplishing this interfered with important areas
of parental decision-making, and therefore violated parents' rights. 12
Having found an intrusion on parental liberty, the Alfonso court
then considered whether the state's interest was sufficiently
compelling to justify this interference, and whether the state's action
was a necessary means to accomplish this objective. 129  The court
concluded that the state's interest was insufficiently compelling to
override parents' rights in this case, 130 and furthermore, that the
program was not a necessary means to address the state's concerns.3
Therefore, the court struck down the program. 132
Applying this analysis to CIPA, parents may argue that their rights
are infringed, even though the statute still permits them to instruct
their children as they please outside of the school setting. Using
Alfonso's reasoning, parents may contend that they are compelled to
send their children to public school,13 3 and are therefore forced to
acquiesce to mandated filtering of their children's Internet use, which
interferes with their right to control the type and amount of
information their children can access. 13" Parents may then claim that
because the state's interest can be satisfied through other mechanisms,
including (for example) direct parental control, monitoring, or
AUPs, 13' CIPA is not a necessary means to achieve the state's
objective at the expense of parents' rights. 136 Furthermore, parents
128. Id.
129. Id. ("Because we believe that the petitioner parents have demonstrated an
intrusion on their constitutionally-protected right to rear their children as they see fit,
we turn next to the issue: whether a compelling State interest is involved and whether
this program is necessary to meet it.").
130. Id. (noting that although the court recognized that the condom distribution
program was a well-intended effort to prevent the spread of sexually transmitted
diseases, "the threat of AIDS cannot summarily obliterate this Nation's fundamental
values" (quoting Ware v. Valley Stream High Sch. Dist., 75 N.Y.2d 114,129 (1989))).
131. Id. at 266-67. The court determined that there were other ways to serve the
state's interest without implementing a condom availability program in the schools.
Students could easily acquire condoms at drug stores at a minimal cost, or through
publicly funded, non-school family planning programs. Id. at 267. The court also
noted that the state could have instituted the same condom distribution program in a
manner that did not interfere with parents' rights, by allowing parents to "opt out,"
thus preventing their children's participation without parental consent. Id.
132. The court prohibited distribution of condoms to minors in public schools
unless they either obtained prior consent from students' parents or guardians, or
provided parents with an opt-out provision. Id. at 268. The New York Court of
Appeals denied motion for appeal. Alfonso v. Fernandez, 637 N.E.2d 279 (Table)
(N.Y. 1994).
133. See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text (describing the Alfonso court's
analysis of the compulsion argument).
134. See supra notes 123-28 and accompanying text (outlining the court's reasoning
in Alfonso).
135. See supra note 37.
136. See supra notes 129-32 and accompanying text (outlining the court's reasoning
in Alfonso); see also Yvonne A. Tamayo, Sex, Sectarians and Secularists: Condoms
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may also argue that filtering Internet access at schools is not justified
because it is not a sufficiently comprehensive means to protect
children from exposure to harmful material. 13 7
Parents' Alfonso-type argument against CIPA is also supported by
policy arguments in favor of parental choice. Parents may claim that
they, not the government, should be making decisions about the
material to which their children are exposed.'38 The Internet is a vast
resource, and parents may want their children to have access to
information about sexuality, human anatomy, and other similar topics
that potentially would be blocked by filtering technology. Some
individuals feel these are sensitive topics, and therefore it is important
to maintain meaningful choices for parents in this realm, and avoid
risking overly burdensome state influence on students' beliefs and
values. 39 The Supreme Court even has noted this: "Technology
expands the capacity to choose; and it denies the potential of this
revolution if we assume the Government is best positioned to make
these choices for us."''" Scholars have argued that the capacity for
individual choice should not be ignored because of the government's
desire to "do the right thing," or in an attempt to advance political
and the Interests of Children, 29 Ind. L. Rev. 593, 600-01 (1996) (citing Alfonso, 606
N.Y.S.2d at 267).
137. For example, children are exposed to sexually explicit material on computers
outside of the school, in movies, and in books and song lyrics.
138. See Gretchen Witte, Comment, Internet Indecency and Impressionable Minds,
44 Vill. L. Rev. 745,775-76 (1999).
Absent a conclusive demonstration of harm from exposure to sexually
explicit materials, parents should not be pre-empted from determining what
is most suitable for their children and can be charged with determining the
fine line between what is to be considered a legitimate educational, artistic
or other objective, and what should be screened from children's experience.
Id. (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1967)). Parents may desire
either no filtering at all, or some mechanism enabling per-parent control over the
information their children have access to while using the Internet at school. While the
latter suggestion is more feasible, it presents administrative problems that would have
to be resolved. See infra notes 169-70 and accompanying text.
139. See Andrew A. Cheng, The Inherent Hostility of Secular Public Education
Toward Religion: Why Parental Choice Best Serves the Core Values of the Religion
Clauses, 19 U. Haw. L. Rev. 697, 702 (1997) ("The public classroom has a powerful
ability to influence the beliefs of young children in their formative years; and the
result is something like a state monopoly on children's minds."). One such
"monopoly" would directly conflict with the rationale behind constitutionally
protected parental rights, as defined in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535
(1925) (noting that the purpose of upholding parents' right to rear and educate their
children is to limit the state's power and recognize that "[t]he child is not the mere
creature of the State"). But see Abner S. Greene, Why Vouchers Are Unconstitutional,
and Why They're Not, 13 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 397, 406-08 (1999)
(suggesting that by creating a parental right to choose where to send children to
school, Pierce takes authority away from the state and, in turn, creates a parental
monopoly).
140. United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000)
(invalidating a law requiring cable operators to either completely scramble sexually
explicit television channels or limit such programming to certain hours).
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interests by advocating children's interests merely as popular political
slogans. 4 Nor (parents may argue) should the state be permitted to
justify supplanting parental decisions in this area with the assumption
that state action is necessary to compensate for a lack of parental
custody.'42 Additionally, CIPA's opponents may argue that deferring
to parental regulation avoids broader constitutional problems, such as
First Amendment concerns, that arise when the federal government
attempts to regulate speech. 43
2. CIPA's Effect Is Tantamount to an Absolute Restriction
The second avenue of contention that parents could pursue against
CIPA would be to concede, in line with parental rights case law, that a
violation of parental liberty only occurs when all opportunities for
control are constrained by the state's action, but then argue that
because CIPA applies to both schools and libraries, 44 and not every
parent can afford Internet access at home, the regulation's effect is
tantamount to an absolute restriction on what some parents can teach
their children outside of school. This argument is similar to a claim
posed by proponents of school vouchers, who maintain that without
state-sponsored vouchers, the right to make choices about where to
send children to school is only a right for wealthy parents. 45  This
proposition is gleaned from Equal Protection cases recognizing
unconstitutional wealth discrimination in situations where
opportunities were completely denied to those without the ability to
pay for them. 46 Under this analysis, parents against CIPA may argue
141. Tamayo, supra note 136, at 617.
142. The government may rebut parents' challenges by claiming that, if given
control, parents will fail to properly instruct or supervise their children's Internet
usage. Parents presumably would disagree with this argument and may be capable of
finding legal support for their position. See Playboy Entm't Group, 529 U.S. at 824-26
(holding that "a court should not presume parents, given full information, will fail to
act," particularly when the government has not proved that informing parents and
supporting their right to control would not adequately address the problem).
143. See Alexander, supra note 9, at 1021-24.
144. Children's Internet Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(1)(B) (2000).
145. See Cheng, supra note 139, at 702 ("This right [to choose alternate schooling]
is illusory for many Americans who do not have the financial means to pay for private
schooling .... [T]he practical effect of compulsory education laws is compulsory
public education." (emphasis omitted)); cf. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct.
2460, 2473 (2002).
[The voucher program] provides benefits directly to a wide spectrum of
individuals, defined only by financial need and residence in a particular
school district. It permits such individuals to exercise genuine choice among
options public and private, secular and religious. The program is therefore a
program of true private choice.
Id.
146. See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 127-28 (1996) (finding an Equal Protection
violation in state civil actions to terminate parental status where parents were unable
to appeal because they could not afford required document preparation fees); Little v.
Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1981) (holding that a state statute forcing requesting
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that because some parents cannot afford Internet access and both
public schools and libraries will have only filtered access, in effect
CIPA prevents some parents from dictating the range of material
their children view on the Internet, and thus the statute
unconstitutionally infringes parental rights. 4 7 Parents may also point
out that CIPA's restrictive character is further evidenced by the fact
that (as in cases upholding parents' rights over state action) the state
is not merely teaching children something that parents disagree with,
but is affirmatively prohibiting parents from doing something and
limiting the information to which their children have access. 48
parties to pay for paternity tests violated the Fourteenth Amendment because parties
were denied an opportunity to be heard merely because they could not afford to
sponsor these tests); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143-44, 149 (1972) (finding an
Equal Protection violation where an election filing fee barred many candidates who
could not afford to run for election); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 241-45 (1970)
(striking down an Illinois law that extended prison terms beyond the statutory
maximum for prisoners who could not afford to pay fines); Douglas v. California, 372
U.S. 353, 355-58 (1963) (criticizing California's appeal process as denying poor
defendants meaningful appellate opportunities because these defendants could not
afford appellate counsel and therefore appellate courts reviewed their cases purely on
the record); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17-20 (1956) (invalidating state fees for
trial transcripts because they prevented poor defendants from acquiring such
transcripts-or even adequate substitutes-for use during the trial and appeals).
147. Essentially, parents would claim that under CIPA their opportunity for
parental control (and ability to counteract state action) is denied because they are
poor, and therefore, CIPA constitutes an absolute restriction on parents' rights. Such
claims would parallel Equal Protection arguments, and to succeed the Court would
have to accept parents' complaint of wealth discrimination as worthy of strict judicial
scrutiny. As previously discussed, if the Court applied low level scrutiny, the law
would likely stand. See supra note 105 and accompanying text (explaining that most
contested statutes meet the minimal threshold for low tier scrutiny). Although the
Supreme Court has not applied strict scrutiny to arguments of wealth discrimination
beyond cases dealing with fundamental rights and access to justice, see supra note 99,
there are policy arguments in favor of extending this protection. These arguments
might be based on the strength of parents' interest, a desire to prevent the state from
making determinations about regulating children's access to information, the
importance of upholding parental rights, the severe deprivation experienced as a
result of the statute, or a desire to provide equal education opportunities to all
students. Cf. Frank I. Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the
Fourteenth Amendment, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 7 (1969) (suggesting the need for a change
in perspective when considering wealth discrimination and opportunity deprivation).
148. See Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 533-34 (1st Cir. 1995)
(noting the distinction between the state limiting parents' ability to educate their
children-which is generally improper state action-and schools teaching things to
students that some parents may disagree with-which is not necessarily problematic).
We think it is fundamentally different for the state to say to a parent, "You
can't teach your child German or send him to a parochial school," than for
the parent to say to the state, "You can't teach my child subjects that are
morally offensive to me." The first instance involves the state proscribing
parents from educating their children, while the second involves parents
prescribing what the state shall teach their children.
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B. Pro-state
Although parents have a constitutional right to control the
education and development of their children, this liberty must be
considered in light of countervailing state interests in protecting
children from exposure to harmful material.' 49 Parents' rights are not
unlimited."1 This is especially true in the context of public schools,
where state authority generally,'51 in conjunction with public schools'
duty to inculcate values in students, 5 2 suggest that parents'
constitutional right to raise their children does not grant parents
absolute authority over what information their children are exposed
to while at school.'53 Moreover, state action only unreasonably
interferes with parental liberty when the action "causes a coercive or
compulsory effect on [parents'] rights, 154 that prevents them from
having any choice or control over the matter targeted by the state's
149. See Covell, supra note 9 at 779-80 n.21 ("We have recognized that there is a
compelling interest in protecting the physical and psychological well-being of minors."
(citing Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989))).
150. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (noting that the state has the
right to limit parental control, particularly when children's welfare is at issue).
151. See Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925).
No question is raised concerning the power of the State reasonably to
regulate all schools, to inspect, supervise and examine them, their teachers
and pupils; to require that all children of proper ageattend some school, that
teachers shall be of good moral character and patriotic disposition, that
certain studies plainly essential to good citizenship must be taught, and that
nothing be taught which is manifestly inimical to the public welfare.
Id.; Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 398 (1923) ("The obvious purpose of this statute
[banning teaching foreign languages] was that the English language should be and
become the mother tongue of all children reared in this state. The enactment of such
a statute comes reasonably within the police power of the state." (citations omitted)).
152. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986) ("Public
education must prepare pupils for citizenship in the Republic .... It must inculcate
the habits and manners of civility as values in themselves conducive to happiness and
as indispensable to the practice of self-government in the community and the nation."
(omission in original) (quoting C. Beard & M. Beard, New Basic History of the
United States 228 (1968))); Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864 (1982) ("[P]ublic
schools are vitally important 'in the preparation of individuals for participation as
citizens,' and as vehicles for 'inculcating fundamental values necessary to the
maintenance of a democratic political system."' (quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 441
U.S. 68, 76-77 (1979))); see also supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text (discussing
Fraser).
153. See Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods., 68 F.3d at 533 (distinguishing Meyer, 262 U.S.
390, and noting, "We do not think ... that this freedom [to choose a different path of
education] encompasses a fundamental constitutional right to dictate the curriculum
at the public school").
154. Curtis v. Sch. Comm., 652 N.E.2d 580, 585 (Mass. 1995). This decision
recognizes that no court has explicitly stated that "coercion" is the requisite standard
for finding a violation of parental liberty, but notes that in cases examining this same
issue, courts have only given credence to such claims if the state's action had a
coercive effect on parents' rights. Id. (citing Doe v. Irwin, 615 F.2d 1162, 1168 (6th
Cir. 1980)).
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Based on this analysis, the state has two main grounds on which it
could argue that CIPA does not unconstitutionally interfere with
parents' right to raise their children. First, the state may argue that
CIPA is justified because the school has a compelling interest in
protecting children from exposure to inappropriate information, and
the state has the authority to implement mechanisms to do this.'
Second, the state may contend that because CIPA does not affect
parents' ability to supplement their children's formal education, the
statute is not an unconstitutional intrusion on parents' right to raise
their children. 57
1. The State Has the Authority To Protect Children
The state may first defend CIPA by emphasizing the substantial
interest the statute serves and the validity of the authority on which it
relies. Schools function to prepare students for survival in a
democratic world that is filled with various viewpoints. 5 ' Public
schools also have the duty to inculcate values in students.'59 Thus,
schools have an interest in protecting students from harmful or
inappropriate material,"" and parents expect-and to some extent rely
on-schools to do this."' In addition to having a strong interest in
155. See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
156. See infra Part II.B.1.
157. See infra Part II.B.2.
158. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods., 68 F.3d at 534 & n.6 (emphasizing schools' duty to
teach students about different points of view in society, to "[prepare] students for
participation in a world replete with complex and controversial issues" (quoting
Alfonso v. Fernandez, 606 N.Y.S.2d 259, 266 (App. Div. 1993))).
159. See supra notes 34-35, 152 and accompanying text; see also Brown v. Bd. of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and
local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great
expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the
importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the
performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the
armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a
principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing
him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to
his environment.
Id. at 493.
160. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
161. See Covell, supra note 9, at 779.
When children are at school, most parents are not in a position to supervise
their children's Internet access, and are thus forced to rely on school officials
to do so. The Supreme Court acknowledges that parents have a legitimate
expectation that schools will protect their children from exposure to sexually
explicit material.
Id. (citing Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 684 (1986); Muller v.
Jefferson Lighthouse Sch., 98 F.3d 1530, 1539-46 (7th Cir. 1996)). At the very least,
parents depend on the government generally to help them protect their children's
welfare. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968) ("[Plarents and others,
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instilling proper values in students and protecting them from harm,
schools possess sufficient authority to accomplish these goals. The
Supreme Court has recognized this, noting, "Today's public school
officials do not merely exercise authority voluntarily conferred on
them by individual parents; rather, they act in furtherance of publicly
mandated educational and disciplinary policies.' 1 62  Thus, schools
have the authority to regulate various aspects of education. 163  By
contrast, parents' rights and the resulting degree of control they have
over schools are limited."6  Therefore, given public schools'
responsibilities, coupled with the limitations of parents' rights, the
state may argue that CIPA complies with constitutional standards
because it serves an important objective that is within the state's
recognized authority.
165
From a policy standpoint, the state may emphasize that it is best
equipped to shield students from accessing inappropriate material on
the Internet, and that mandated filtering is the most effective solution
to achieve this end. Moreover, the state may argue that parents, left
to their own resolve, would fail to successfully manage the task of
supervising their children's Internet usage. 166 This is particularly true
teachers for example, who have... primary responsibility for children's well-being
are entitled to the support of laws designed to aid discharge of that responsibility.").
162. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 336 (1985) (explaining that schools are
subject to the limits imposed by the Fourth Amendment because schools act as agents
of the state).
163. See, e.g., Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683-84 (noting that "it is a highly appropriate
function of public school education to prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive terms
in public discourse," particularly when the speech is sexually explicit and the audience
includes minors); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76-78, 80-81 (1979) (validating a
law requiring United States citizenship to teach in New York public schools, based on
public schools' responsibility to inculcate democratic values in students and the need
to have teachers capable of fulfilling this duty).
164. See Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods., 68 F.3d at 534.
If all parents had a fundamental constitutional right to dictate individually
what the schools teach their children, the schools would be forced to cater a
curriculum for each student whose parents had genuine moral disagreements
with the school's choice of subject matter. We cannot see that the
Constitution imposes such a burden on state educational systems.
Id. One scholar has argued that in some situations, parental intervention infringes
minors' rights. Catherine J. Ross, An Emerging Right for Mature Minors to Receive
Information, 2 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 223 (1999).
165. See Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) ("[R]ights guaranteed
by the Constitution may not be abridged by legislation which has no reasonable
relation to some purpose within the competency of the State."). Here, the state's
purpose for instituting CIPA is to prevent students from accessing sexually explicit
information on the Internet while using school computers. The state derives its
authority from its responsibility to protect children and teach them appropriate
values.
166. See COPA Comm'n Report, supra note 37, at 14.
[M]any families feel unfamiliar with the Internet, and find it harder to
protect their children online than they do in the real world. Differences in
language or culture and resource limitations may challenge families' ability
to protect their children online. Further, children may access the Internet in
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given the fact that a significant amount of children's Internet use
occurs at school, not in the home. 67 The Supreme Court has held that
in situations where parental control is insufficient, the state is justified
in acting to compensate for the lack of parental custody.1
6 1
Furthermore, from a practical standpoint, if CIPA was struck down as
an unconstitutional violation of parents' rights, it is unclear what could
serve as a feasible alternative. From the government's perspective,
having no filters at all would be an extreme and undesirable
measure. 6 19 On the other hand, the alternative-individualized, per-
parent filtering systems-presents administrative problems that may
prove unsolvable.17 1
2. CIPA Does Not Interfere with Parental Supervision Outside
School
Aside from having the authority and responsibility to implement
regulations to protect children from exposure to inappropriate
material on the Internet, the state may also defend CIPA against
parents' claims by emphasizing that the regulation does not prohibit
parents from making decisions about their children's Internet use, or
access to information, outside of school. As long as parents remain
free to teach their children according to their own views in private
places other than their own home-at school, at libraries and at the home of
friends, relatives and caregivers, where the direct supervision of parents may
not be possible.
Id.
167. See id.; supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
168. See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 640 (1968) (Fuld, J., concurring)
("While the supervision of children's reading may best be left to their parents, the
knowledge that parental control or guidance cannot always be provided and society's
transcendent interest in protecting the welfare of children justify reasonable
regulation of the sale of material to them." (quoting People v. Kahan, 206 N.E.2d 333,
334 (N.Y. 1965))).
169. See supra notes 22-36 and accompanying text (describing the extent of sexually
explicit information available on the Internet and why schools have an interest in
preventing students from accessing this material).
170. A per-parent filtering system in public schools would be time consuming,
financially burdensome, and extremely complex. Schools would be forced to develop
individualized software programs, or assign students to particular computer terminals
that have a level of filtration approved by their parents. If each parent was allowed to
individually tailor the extent of information their child could access online, each
student would likely require their own personal filtering system. This could result in
schools being forced to buy and install as many different filtering software programs
as there are students attending the school. Furthermore, it would be difficult for
schools to keep track of which materials each child is permitted to view, and even
more problematic to monitor and enforce these policies. Cf Mozert v. Hawkins
County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1071-73 (6th Cir. 1987) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(concluding that the text challenged in the case should remain part of the curriculum
because removal would result in administrative problems such as classroom
disruption, alteration of teaching methods, and interference with curriculum
cohesion).
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realms, courts will not find a deprivation of parental liberty stemming
.from a particular state action.' 7' The state may argue that such is the
case with CIPA, where parents maintain many options for controlling
their children's access to information. 7 2 CIPA's provisions limit the
information students can access at school, in an effort to protect them
from harmful material.7 3 If parents disagree with this censorship and
want their children to have access to this material, nothing in CIPA
prevents them from doing so outside of public schools and libraries.'74
The fact that school attendance is compulsory is insufficient in and of
itself to constitute the requisite "compulsion" necessary to support
claims of parental rights infringement in this case.7 5  Furthermore,
parents may pose wealth discrimination arguments as evidence that
CIPA amounts to an absolute restriction on parental rights, but the
state would have several grounds to rebut this claim.
First, the state may point out that it is questionable whether CIPA's
application in public libraries will survive Supreme Court review. 6
Should the Court find CIPA unconstitutional in this forum, parents'
wealth argument against CIPA collapses. 77  Second, even if the
schools and libraries block access for minors, and parents cannot
171. See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
172. If parents want their children to have access to material that is blocked by the
filtering technology implemented in schools, they may provide unfiltered Internet
access at home, use a friend's or family member's computer, or use other media (such
as videos or books) to inform the child. On the other hand, if parents want to restrict
their children's Internet access even more than schools are already doing with
mandated filters, nothing in CIPA prohibits such requests.
173. CIPA mandates filtered Internet service-limiting the amount of information
students access at school-to prevent exposure to obscenity, child pornography, and
sexually explicit material deemed harmful to minors. Children's Internet Protection
Act, 47 U.S.C. § 254 (h)(5), (6) (2000).
174. Public schools and libraries are the only environments that, under CIPA, must
have filtered Internet access, and CIPA only applies to those schools and libraries
that accept federal funding for Internet service. Id.
175. See Curtis v. Sch. Comm., 652 N.E.2d 580, 587 (Mass. 1995) ("With the
exception of the Alfonso case, it appears that cases requiring an opt-out or 'excusal
system' have involved school programs which would otherwise be compulsory."
(citing Citizens for Parental Rights v. San Mateo County Bd. of Educ., 124 Cal. Rptr.
68 (Ct. App. 1975); Medeiros v. Keyosaki, 478 P.2d 314 (Haw. 1970))); see also
Alfonso v. Fernandez, 606 N.Y.S.2d 259, 273-74 (App. Div. 1993) (Eiber, J.,
dissenting).
176. The Federal District Court in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania concluded
that in the context of public libraries CIPA violates the First Amendment. Am.
Library Ass'n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401 (E.D. Pa. 2002). The Supreme
Court recently has decided to review this case. Am. Library Ass'n v. United States,
No. 02-361, 2002 WL 31060372 (U.S. Nov. 12, 2002) (noting probable jurisdiction).
177. If the district court's ruling is affirmed, and CIPA becomes inapplicable in
public libraries, the argument that CIPA's provisions are tantamount to a restriction
on all realms of parental control necessarily fails. The state would argue that if
parents want their children to have open access to the Internet (beyond what is
provided in schools), even if they cannot afford Internet access at home, they can
bring their children to the local public library, where access would be free and not
subject to state-mandated filtering.
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afford access at home, it is difficult to imagine that children would still
be completely prohibited from ever having the opportunity to access
unblocked Internet service, or at least otherwise obtain the prohibited
information through some other means. 78  Finally, the state may
emphasize the limited persuasiveness of wealth arguments beyond the
small class of cases toward which the Court is sympathetic. The Court
validates wealth arguments only in a few specific contexts,'179 and even
in these cases, successful claims must identify a class of individuals
who, because of their impecunity, experienced an absolute
deprivation of liberty resulting from a particular state action.8  The
state may thus contend that parents' claims against CIPA neither fit
into the narrow category of accepted wealth arguments, nor constitute
an absolute deprivation, and therefore parents' potential challenge
against CIPA fails.
III. CIPA DOES NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY INFRINGE PARENTAL
LIBERTY
One basis for possible future lawsuits challenging CIPA in the
context of public schools may be the allegation that CIPA violates
parental liberty. However, the state would likely prevail against this
challenge and, at least with reference to a claim of parental liberty
infringement, CIPA as it applies in public schools would survive
judicial scrutiny. This conclusion rests on several factors. First, the
state has a strong interest in protecting students from exposure to
sexually explicit information and the state possesses the authority to
implement laws to achieve this goal.' Second, because parents
maintain the right to make decisions about this issue in private realms,
CIPA's restrictions are too narrow to constitute an unconstitutional
178. Relatives, friends, and cyber cafes are some examples of additional sources
that may provide Internet access that would not be regulated by the statute. Cyber
cafes do charge for Internet usage, but this fee is presumably less than the cost of
Internet access in the home. Also, there are alternative resources-i.e. books, videos,
or magazines-that could provide the same information.
179. See supra note 99.
180. Cf San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 20 (1973)
(reviewing a class action claim that a Texas school-financing system deprived students
in low-income districts of equal education). The Rodriguez Court concluded that
because the system did not entirely deprive students of an education-but provided
minimally "adequate" education-the law did not unconstitutionally discriminate
against low-income families. Id. at 23-25. Aside from the limitations of parents'
potential wealth argument itself, the state may also argue that parents mistakenly rely
on the Supreme Court's recent decision in the voucher case, Zelman v. Simmons-
Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460 (2002), to support their discrimination claim. This decision
focused primarily on whether the Establishment Clause is violated by school voucher
programs, and thus should not be cited as authority extending the application of
wealth arguments. The fact that voucher programs do not violate the Establishment
Clause by no means suggests that the Equal Protection Clause requires them.
181. See infra Part III.A.
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interference with parents' rights.1 2  Additionally, parents' claims
against the law rely on misplaced and unconvincing analysis.183
Finally, examination of the broader implications of CIPA confirms
that the statute should be upheld. 84
A. CIPA Is Based on a Substantial State Interest and Valid State
Authority
State action that potentially infringes parents' rights is
constitutional if it is with "reasonable relation to some purpose within
the competency of the State to effect."'8 5  Accordingly, the state's
defense of CIPA against a potential accusation of a parental liberty
violation is convincing. The state has a substantial interest in
preventing students from accessing sexually explicit material in school,
and the state has recognized authority to implement restrictions to
achieve this objective.
Given the overwhelming amount of sexually explicit material
students may access online,8 6 coupled with public schools' duty to
instill values in students, 87 the state must restrict student Internet use
in school. Aside from acting on the desire to protect children, schools
must take preemptive action to prevent potential liability from
parents upset about the information their children view at school.'88
One scholar has predicted, "If a student is exposed to inappropriate
material on the Internet while at school.., legal action is certainly
possible."'89
In the past, different situations have raised similar 'concerns about
children's exposure to inappropriate material, and remedial responses
to these concerns have been upheld.19 The state is in the best position
182. See infra Part II.B.
183. See infra Part III.C.
184. See infra Part III.D.
185. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923) ("The established doctrine is
that [due process] may not be interfered with, under the guise of protecting the public
interest, by legislative action which is arbitrary or without reasonable relation to some
purpose within the competency of the State to effect.").
186. See supra notes 22-33 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 34-35, 152 and accompanying text.
188. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
189. Rutherford, supra note 9, at 429. Parents have already filed suits against state
institutions for failing to protect their children from exposure to inappropriate
material on the Internet. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 1, at 950 (discussing Kathleen R.
v. City of Livermore, 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 772 (Ct. App. 2001), a case where a mother
sued the local public library for allowing her son to download sexually explicit images
on the library's computers).
190. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (upholding a
school's restrictions on inappropriate student speech in the school newspaper); Bethel
Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (upholding a school's disciplinary
action against a student who used lewd and indecent speech during a school-wide
assembly); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (banning the sale of obscene
magazines to minors).
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to implement mechanisms to protect children from accessing harmful
material on school computers. Although some alternatives to CIPA
may be proposed,1 9' none are sufficient to address the problem.
Specifically, parental control is neither an adequate nor practical
means to limit children's Internet use in school. Many parents do not
have the resources or ability to monitor their children's Internet use,
192
and even if the schools implemented regulations at parents'
direction-i.e., through opt out programs or per-parent filtering
systems-this would present severe administrative problems that may
not be surmountable. 93 It is important to remember that parental
liberty is limited and does not entail free reign over the public school
system. 9 4  Public schools must make determinations about what
information is appropriate for students to view, as well as how to
regulate student activities to comply with these determinations.' 95
CIPA is an example of the state exercising precisely this authority, in
pursuit of a compelling state interest, and therefore the statute is
constitutional.
B. CIPA Does Not Usurp All Parental Decision-Making Authority
Even if the state has sufficient authority to create legislation
targeting a recognized interest, the state cannot do so at the expense
of individuals' constitutional rights; namely, parents' right to raise
their children. CIPA complies with this proviso. Although parents'
constitutional right to rear their children is a well-established
liberty, 96 it is not one without limits. The defined constitutional
parameters of parents' rights must be taken into account when
deciding whether state action unconstitutionally intrudes on them.'97
The existence of parental liberty does not imply that the government
cannot interfere with parental control at all.19 Instead, parents' ability
to make decisions about a particular area cannot be restricted
completely. As long as state regulation does not dominate all domains
of parental decision-making, it is constitutional.' 99
CIPA does not apply to all realms of parental decision-making, and
therefore it does not overstep the designated margins of parents'
rights. Under CIPA, parents maintain the freedom to instruct their
191. Two main propositions parents might suggest include either no regulation of
student Internet use or parental control.
192. See supra notes 166-67.
193. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 150-55 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 34-35, 152 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 112-13, 150-55 and accompanying text (discussing these
parameters).
198. See supra notes 150-55 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
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children in realms outside of the school-i.e. the home, church, etc.200
Therefore, CIPA is distinguishable from the legislation invalidated in
cases upholding parental rights, 21" and is closer to statutes upheld in
situations where courts have found no violation of parental liberty.2 2
Parents' position that for low-income families CIPA is tantamount
to a total restriction 2 3 is unpersuasive both because the Court is not
overly sympathetic to most wealth arguments,20 4 and even if the Court
were to give credence to this assertion, the deprivation experienced by
low-income families as a result of CIPA is not absolute. Indigent
families who wish to expose their children to information that is
unavailable on school computers have many alternative ways to
achieve this exposure. 25 Additionally, if CIPA is invalidated in the
context of public libraries,2 6 parents' argument that CIPA is
tantamount to an outright restriction automatically fails because in
addition to other avenues of resources, children will have access to
unrestricted, free Internet service at public libraries.
27
C. Parents' Claims Against CIPA Rely on Unconvincing Analyses
CIPA would likely trump potential challenges that it violates
parental liberty not only because of the strength of the state's defense
of the statute, but also because parents' prospective arguments against
CIPA are unconvincing. First, policy-based propositions that parents,
not the government, should regulate what children are exposed to
while using the Internet at school are misplaced. Successful
arguments that the government is overstepping its bounds by
200. See supra note 172 and accompanying text (noting CIPA's limited
application).
201. For example, unlike Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), where the
invalidated statute prohibited teaching foreign languages at all, under CIPA, parents
who want their children exposed to sexually explicit material (assuming it is not
otherwise illegal) are still able to do so outside the school environment. CIPA is
similarly distinguishable from Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), which
overruled a law forcing children to attend public schools.
202. CIPA presents a situation analogous to the one in Ginsberg v. New York, 390
U.S. 629 (1968), where a law banning the sale of obscene magazines to minors was
upheld because it did not preclude parents from purchasing these magazines for their
children. The circumstances resulting from CIPA are also similar to those described
in Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of Education, 827 F.2d 1058, 1067 (6th Cir. 1987),
which upheld the use of particular texts in a public school partly because parents who
disagreed with those texts could send their children to private or parochial schools, or
home school them; and Curtis v. School Committee, 652 N.E.2d 580 (Mass. 1995), a
case upholding an in-school condom availability program because students were not
required to participate, and therefore parents maintained decision-making authority
over their children's beliefs about contraceptives.
203. See supra Part II.A.2.
204. See supra note 99.
205. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
206. See supra note 176.
207. If there were any filters on these computers, it would be a voluntary decision
made by the library, not a result of a federally mandated regulation.
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instituting particular regulations in public schools are grounded in a
fear that the action in question may result in a "state monopoly," in
which children are molded and developed into "creatures of the
state. '22" However, in the context of CIPA, this concern is unfounded.
This is because CIPA does not affect those realms outside public
schools (with the exception of public libraries); under this statute the
state is not exercising exclusive control over children, and therefore
the law does not create a state monopoly. Furthermore, by restricting
Internet access, the state is not affirmatively providing children with
information that might influence their beliefs according to the
government's point of view, but actually withholding information
from students.
209
Second, parents' potential argument that CIPA is unnecessary-
that because there are other mechanisms for restricting children's
Internet access, there is insufficient justification for CIPA2 111-is
misleading. Although there are alternative solutions to CIPA, the
state's interest cannot be adequately satisfied by these means because
they are not as effective as CIPA's measures.21' Therefore, mandated
filtering is necessary to achieve the state's goal.
Additionally, parents' possible criticism of the comprehensiveness
208. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 2,14-15 (1972) (noting that the state's
interest in a universal formal education for all children was insufficient to trump
parents' right to dictate the religious upbringing of their children); Pierce v. Soc'y of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (concluding that a law mandating public school
education violated parents' rights because "[t]he fundamental theory of liberty upon
which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the State
to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers
only. The child is not the mere creature of the State ...."); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 402 (1923) (striking down a law banning the teaching of foreign languages,
noting, "The desire of the legislature to foster a homogeneous people with American
ideals prepared readily to understand current discussions of civic matters is easy to
appreciate.... But the means adopted, we think, exceed the limitations upon the
power of the State ...."); Alfonso v. Fernandez, 606 N.Y.S.2d 259, 266 (App. Div.
1993) (invalidating a condom distribution program in public schools in part because
the state was attempting to influence students' beliefs about sexual matters, in conflict
with parents' rights). The Alfonso court explained, "Through its public schools the
City of New York has made a judgment that minors should have unrestricted access
to contraceptives, a decision which is clearly within the purview of [parents']
constitutionally protected right to rear their children, and then has forced thatjudgment on them." Id.; see also Cheng, supra note 139, at 702.
209. Although it may be argued that an omission of information is still an act that
may shape students' beliefs, parents who are concerned about this can counteract the
state by privately providing their children with this information. This situation is
distinct from those where a state monopoly is created-effectively preventing
opportunities for parental counteraction-or when the state exposes students to
material that parents disagree with, who are then helpless to "undo" the exposure.
210. See supra text accompanying notes 135-36.
211. See supra notes 166-70 and accompanying text (emphasizing that the
alternatives parents might argue for-either no filtering or complete parental
control-are neither feasible nor effective).
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of CIPA is an unconvincing basis for invalidating the statute.2 2 Just
because children are exposed to sexually explicit material outside of
school does not mean that schools should give up and allow them to
view harmful material in school. Such reasoning is illogical and
contrary to the state's interests.
Finally, an even less impressive challenge to CIPA that parents may
offer would rely on Alfonso v. Fernandez213 as an exception to the
established doctrine that parental rights violations are premised on an
absolute deprivation of parental control. 214  This argument is
unpersuasive for several reasons. First, Alfonso is a New York State
court decision, and thus has limited authority as a controlling
precedent. Second, the case dealt with a situation where the school
affirmatively provided students with information that contradicted
many parents' beliefs.215 The potential controversy surrounding
CIPA, by contrast, centers on the fact that the school is not providing
access to certain information, and is thus distinguishable from
Alfonso. 216  Finally, the Alfonso decision is not very persuasive
authority because some of its analysis is questionable. The Alfonso
court identified a violation of parental rights partly based on the
conclusion that parents are "compelled" to send their children to
public school.2 '7 However, given viable options of home schooling, or
attendance at private or parochial schools, it is difficult to accept this
reasoning.2 1
8
212. See supra note 137 and accompanying text (suggesting that because regulating
Internet access at school is not comprehensive enough to entirely prevent children
from viewing sexually explicit materials, mandated filtering is not justified as a
necessary means to achieve the state's interest).
213. 606 N.Y.S.2d 259 (App. Div. 1993).
214. See supra Part II.A.1.
215. This case reviewed a condom distribution program, challenged by parents who
were upset that the state was providing the means for students to engage in protected
sex, thus interfering with parents' ability to "influence and guide the sexual activity of
their children without State interference." Alfonso, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 266.
216. Mandated filters do not provide the means for engaging in activity, nor do
they provide the means for accessing inappropriate material. The result of
implementing Internet filters is exactly the opposite. Therefore, rather than usurping
parental decision-making authority in a sensitive topic area-which was a concern
expressed by the Alfonso court, id.-CIPA encourages parental control by not
allowing children to access sexually explicit information at school, thus leaving it up to
the parents to decide whether to expose their children to this material.
217. See supra note 123-24 and accompanying text.
218. The Alfonso court seemed to ignore the possibility of home schooling
children, and dismissed private school as an option because some parents could not
afford private school tuition. However, as previously noted, wealth arguments for
potential constitutional infringements are not readily accepted. See supra note 99.
Moreover, given the recent upholding of state-sponsored voucher systems, see
Zelman v. Simmon-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460 (2002), parents' argument that they cannot
afford private school and therefore are "compelled" to send their children to public
schools is even less convincing, particularly if voucher programs become more
prominent.
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D. CIPA Neither Threatens To Increase State Authority over Minors
Nor Decreases Parents' Control over Their Children
Regulation of children's Internet use at school is necessary.219
Students are increasingly accessing the Internet at school.221' Given
the substantial amount of sexually explicit material published
online,22' student exposure to this information must be prevented.222
Putting other potential challenges aside,223 CIPA is a constitutional
means to achieve this goal and should be upheld. In addition to the
solid legal arguments supporting CIPA, the statute's general
implications also suggest that it does not unconstitutionally infringe
parental rights and should trump such challenges. These broad
implications include the fact that mandated filters do not threaten to
impose overly burdensome state action or increase state control over
schools, and they do not force parents to sacrifice parental liberty.
CIPA does not expand the government's authority to regulate. The
government already enjoyed-and continues to enjoy-broad
regulatory power, particularly in public schools, and especially when
dealing with children's welfare.224 CIPA is merely an example of the
state constitutionally exercising this authority. Moreover, given its
limited scope, it is a small example of this authority.225 Allowing the
state to filter Internet access does not therefore result in
unconstitutional state influence over minors.226  By preventing
sexually explicit material from being viewed in school, the state is
actually taking a "hands off" approach, leaving it up to the students'
parents to decide which material their children may access.
By allowing parents to maintain decision-making authority over this
issue, parents' rights are not only preserved by the statute, but are
arguably enhanced. CIPA does not contract parents' rights in the
public school realm. Moreover, parents' rights have never been
absolute;227 they have always been limited, particularly in this arena.
228
Thus, CIPA does not threaten to extinguish parental control over
children. In addition, although CIPA's provisions do not invite
parents to exert influence in public schools, the statute still displays
recognition of, and respect for, a necessary and constitutionally
219. See supra notes 22-36 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 22-33 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
223. See supra Part I.B.2.a., b.
224. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
225. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
226. Fear of excessive state influence is at the heart of parental rights claims and is
the underlying justification for invalidating statutes as an infringement of parental
liberty. See supra note 209 and accompanying text. Without this factor, parental
rights challenges against a statute are prima facie unreasonable.
227. See supra notes 112-13,150,154 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 151-53 and accompanying text.
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mandated degree of parental liberty. CIPA achieves this by
addressing the state's interest in protecting minors, while leaving the
door open for their parents to decide if there is additional information
they want to make accessible to their children.2 9  Consequently,
parental liberty is not infringed, but is at the very least maintained,
and perhaps even expanded. Therefore, CIPA does not
unconstitutionally intrude on parents' rights, and should be upheld
against accusations stating otherwise.
229. Parental liberty is upheld by CIPA to the extent that the statute's regulations
do not extend beyond public schools and libraries, and therefore do not interfere with
parents' ability to make decisions about this topic in all other realms.
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